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LESSONS FROM THE SWORDBEARERS: THE EVOLVING
PARADIGM OF THE UNITED STATES' MILITARY
PARTICIPATION IN UNITED NATIONS' OPERATIONS
Christopher H. Lytton
t
In the third century before Christ, the Samnites succeeded in trapping a
large Roman army in the Claudine forks. Possessed of a glut of prison-
ers, the Samnite ruler asked his father, Herennius, what he should do
with them. "Let them all go," replied the father. The son said that this
was impossible. "Then kill them all," countered the father. This was
equally impossible, said his son, and he asked for some middle course.
"There is none," said the wise father, for a middle course would neither
make the Romans your friends nor deprive you of your enemies."
-Erich Eyck1
I. INTRODUCTION
The foregoing historical scene makes an eloquent statement about the
nature of leadership. However, the moral can be illustrated by more recent
events. Over half a century ago, the American people were jolted out of
their blissful isolation by the startling news that the United States of
t
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America had been attacked by the Japanese. Pearl Harbor was the
rallying cry for America's entry and victory in the Second World War. The
actions that followed the tragedy in Hawaii were decisive and successful.
The American military machine, along with its allies, emerged uncondi-
tionally victorious at the conclusion of the Second World War. There was
simply no middle course to unconditional surrender.
Pearl Harbor was an attack on the American military, on a Pacific
island and the casualties were largely military personnel. Now the children
and grandchildren of the "greatest generation" have suffered their own
day of infamy. The appalling atrocities of September 11, 2001, have
changed America, Americans and the world. There is an undeniable new-
world-order emerging from the wreckage in lower Manhattan. What form
it will take, we can only wonder.
Will America lead the world in a war against international terrorism
within the existing global power structures such as the United Nations and
NATO, or will she revert to her isolationist roots and operate unilaterally?
Whether America chooses to heed the advice of her first President George
Washington, and steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the
foreign world in this operation, or whether she turns to the United Nations
Security Council for leadership, America must take decisive action and be
firm and resolute in her course.
The recent calamity in New York, Virginia and Pennsylvania will not
only impact America's war on terrorism, it will also forever change the role
the United States military plays in operations around the world. Even as
the rubble is cleared from the streets of New York City, the flame of
violence still burns in the Balkans, as the world is forced to watch as a
combination of the globe's preeminent military forces falter in their
bumbling efforts to maintain peace in the tiny nation of Macedonia. The
result of this persistent international disunity, spanning almost a decade, is
that some two-million people in the region have been displaced and an
inexcusable two hundred thousand lives have been lost. It is arguable
whether the billions of dollars and thousands of soldiers in the region have
truly solved more problems than they have created. The primary reason
for this colossal international failure is a complete lack of leadership,
vision and cohesion amongst the leading nations of the world.
The Eyck description of the Romans and Samnites, teaches the lesson
that indecision is not an option, if one is to succeed. Unfortunately for
humanity, history has been an imperfect director and cast many leaders
with a lack of focus and decisiveness in the roles of prime minister,
president, chancellor, tsar, emperor, or king or queen. The paradigm of
poor casting in the past century has certainly been Europe. As a result of
the continent's too-frequent poor eye for talent, early twentieth-century
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Europe had the dubious distinction of introducing humankind to a new
form of art-killing and destruction on an industrial scale. European
leadership also introduced the term world war into the lexicon of history.'
Although the images of the blood-soaked fields of Belgium and
France, and the destruction of modern day Poland may have faded from
our collective memory, they hold lessons we cannot afford to forget.
This essay will use examples of leadership during and after the Great
War to focus attention on the critical issue of the relationship between the
Armed Forces of the United States and the United Nations.
Beginning with the historical backdrop of the Great War, this essay
will show how an indeterminate foreign policy can lead to untold human
suffering and national calamity. Additionally, this essay will examine the
debate over the role and authority of the United Nations as it relates to the
Armed Forces of the United States of America and the American
Constitution.
II. LESSONS FROM THE GREAT WAR
In the summer of 1914, the age of empire was on life support, still
clinging to the last vestiges of Victorian hegemony. This notorious
summer has been the topic of countless works and yet it remains one of
history's mysteries.' Rather like the Charge of the Light Brigade or the
Battle of the Bulge, the hot summer of 1914 is shrouded in the fog of war.
Why and how did the Great War happen? This has been a persistent query
for over eighty years. Yet, no matter whom you read, be it Barbara
Tuchman, John Keagan, Martin Gilbert, Paul von Hindenburg, or Douglas
Haig, there is no satisfactory answer. No amount of research will ever
provide an adequate explanation for the outbreak of the Great War and
why or how confusion and stubbornness was able to nourish the calamity
for four devastating years. There is, however, one indisputable fact about
the Great War: the conflict was initiated and perpetuated by a mere
handful of men. These notorious leaders, known as the Lions of July4 or
the Swordbearers' demanded carnage, largely because they were unable to
identify and establish the ultimate goals of the conflict. This confused and
2. The Great War of 1914-1918 was not known as World War I until well after the end of
the hostilities.
3. To borrow a phrase from the popular show of the same name on the Discovery
Channel.
4. See generally WILLIAM JANNEN, JR., THE LIONS OF JULY: PRELUDE TO WAR, 1914
(1997).
5. See generally CORRELLI BARNETT, THE SWORDBEARERS: SUPREME COMMAND IN THE
FIRST WORLD WAR (1965).
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haphazard strategy is largely to blame for the length of the war.
Their ruinous legacy of weak leadership did not end with the war;
rather, the shortsightedness continued through the peace process and
interwar years. The French, who proportionally suffered the most
devastation, failed to develop a coherent foreign policy to lead the Paris
Peace Conference. Unfortunately, the French sought only to punish the
Huns, regardless of how this would affect the future peace and security of
Europe. This grim and myopic determination was evidenced by the Tiger
Clemanceau's actions at Versailles. The draconian peace, or the diktat of
Versailles, created more chaos and devastation than the Great War itself,
because it played a significant role in the outbreak of war in 1939. It is
hard to dispute the theory that 1914-1918 and 1939-1945 were, collectively,
Europe's second Thirty Years' War. France's attempt to reduce Germany
to a second-rate continental power fanned the flames of National
Socialism, and arguably made possible Corporal Adolph Hitler's seizure of
power.
The British Empire suffered from the same combination of myopia
and puzzlement. The British could arrive at no better foreign policy in the
postwar years than that of detachment from continental affairs and
appeasement as the road to "peace in our time." These policies, like those
of the French, were largely to blame for the outbreak of war in 1939. If the
British Empire had threatened to intervene in Munich, rather than
appease, would Hitler have been so bold? If the British had been more
engaged in continental affairs, would the French have been permitted to
punish Germany to the extent they did? Or, would the British have
provided a check to the growing French hegemony?
Still harder to understand were the goals of Germany's foreign policy.
From the blank check to Austria-Hungary, to the Third Reich re-fighting
Kaiser Wilhelm's war in 1939, the Germans suffered from the same
indecision as that of their enemies. While all of this may seem to some
like ancient history, the impact of 1914 cannot be relegated to the ash heap
of history, because its consequences have directly shaped the world in
which we live.
The Great War, and its progeny, World War II, cut a swath of death
and destruction all across Europe. Sixty years later, the continent is still
suffering the consequences. One need only look to the Frankenstein of
Versailles, the former Yugoslavia, to see that people are still bleeding and
dying because of the Lions of July and their ill-conceived policies.
III. THE BURDEN OF EMPIRE
So, what do the acts and omission of now-antiquated European lead-
ers who extolled the virtue of "oaths to the colors" and words like:
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warlords, cran, &an, and empire have to do with the leadership of the
world's indisputable superpower in the digital era? In short, everything.
Leadership is leadership. Whether we are discussing Alexander the Great,
Foch, Eisenhower, or George W. Bush, a leader must lead. It is not
sufficient for those placed in command of great nations to merely be of
good intentions. The George W. Bush administration has inherited a
nation that appears to be at the zenith of its power. America's role in the
global community is undeniable. While organizations such as the
European Community (E.C.) attempt to carve out their niche roles in the
world, only the United Nations (U.N.) is capable of providing a second
voice of leadership on the world stage. Thus, it is somewhat inevitable that
the United Nations and the United States will experience times of both
cooperation and disagreement, despite the longstanding accusations that
the United Nations functions as an American puppet. Recent events have
demonstrated an estranged relationship between the United States and the
United Nations, as U.N. members have snubbed the United States and
attempted to relegate the American voice to the sidelines. The current
Bush administration seems to be one of the most capable and experienced
administrations in the past century when it comes to foreign policy issues.
Therefore, the Bush White House may seek to resolve many of the
nation's foreign policy dilemmas. To be sure, one long-ignored quagmire
is the military relationship between the United States and the United
Nations, specifically, what role will America play in U.N. military
operations.
The Clinton presidency was global in thought and interventionist in
action. The activities of the Clinton administration turned the United
States into the world's supercop. The Clinton years saw the commander-
in-chief exercising his power to dispatch American servicemen and women
around the world to try to achieve what were often murky and inconsistent
goals. Although the goals were often murky and the means uncertain, the
power of the president to make those decisions was not considered
controversial in nature. This is a fundamental problem with the way
modern Americans view their president. The commander-in-chief should
not be regarded as the generalissimo, but as the duly elected representative
of the American taxpayer.
IV. THE DEVELOPMENT OF PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWERS
Prior to the creation of the United States of America, the power to
make, declare, and fund war was in the hands of the ruling monarch alone.
To change this old-world order, the framers of the Constitution set forth a
revolutionary structure of government, and established an effective
2001]
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separation of powers. In particular, the separation of the purse and the
sword was established as a pillar of American society.6 The rationale
supporting this innovative concept was summarized in the writings of
James Madison when he wrote:
Those who are to conduct a war cannot in the nature of things, be
proper or safe judges, whether a war ought to be commenced, contin-
ued, or concluded. They are barred from the latter functions by a great
principle in free-government, analogous to that which separates the
sword from the purse, or the power of executing from the power of
enacting laws.'
In Madison's statement one can find support for the contention that
the framers attempted to limit the Executive's war powers. One may also
look to the expansive war powers granted Congress in the Constitution
itself to support executive limitation.' However, for the proponents of
executive limitation there is an enigma in the fact that the framers
originally intended to grant Congress the power to "make war" as opposed
to the codified power to "declare war." 9 The decision to substitute the
single word make for declare, renders it difficult to clarify what the limits
of the Executive's war powers were intended to be. Why was Congress'
power diminished? Unfortunately, history also fails to provide us with a
bright-line rule because, although the United States has only declared war
five times, its troops have been engaged in hostilities abroad over two
hundred times.°  Furthermore, unlike other conflicts between the
executive and the legislative branches, the war powers issue is one that the
judicial branch is reluctant to resolve." Therefore, this controversy, which
6. Louis FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 8 (1995).
7. THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 148 (Gaillard Hunt ed. 1910); FISHER, supra note
6, at 9.
8. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
9. Dean N. Reinhardt, The United States Military and United Nations Peacekeeping
Operations, 19 Hous. J. INT'L L. 245, 247 (1996).
10. See DONALD L. WESTERFIELD, WAR POWERS: THE PRESIDENT, THE CONGRESS AND
THE QUESTION OF WAR 168 (1996). The five declared wars were: (1) The War of 1812, (2)
The Mexican War, (3) The Spanish-American War, (4) World War I and (5) World War 11.
11. U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 1-2. The authority of the judicial branch is set forth in Article
III, sections 1 and 2 of the Constitution:
The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such
inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. ...
The Judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
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was recognized by the framers, continues to elude any concrete resolution,
while service people find themselves all over the world for reasons that are
unclear to the American public.
Although this issue was controversial prior to the Second World War,
the postwar role of the United States as a superpower and the creation of
the United Nations made the equation even more problematic. From the
failure of the League of Nations, the United Nations emerged as the
antidote to the disease of carnage that had plagued Europe in the previous
decades. The United Nations, through its charter, dedicated itself to
maintaining international peace and security, as well as other goals. 2 To
maximize its ability to do this, the United Nations established a Security
Council as one of its organs and vested in that body the authority to make
these aspirations a reality, through force if necessary. While the efficacy of
this system is debatable, the doctrinal foundation of the United Nations
includes goals that all civilized nations should embrace. The five
permanent and ten rotating members of the Security Council may
ultimately represent an effective vehicle for the establishment of
international peace and security; however, this is not the current
situation. 1"
The idea of collective security is not unique to the United Nations.
Previous examples include the Athenian league of 478 B.C., the Holy
Alliance of Austria, Russia and Prussia in 1815, and the post-WWI League
of Nations in 1919.14 However, these never possessed the global reach or
military might of the Security Council. Nonetheless, without the political,
economic, and military support of the United States, the United Nations
would face an untenable future. Thus, there are those who argue that it is
incumbent upon the president to extend the Executive's power to its limits
in support of the United Nations to achieve world peace. This must also
be done, the argument follows, in order to fulfill the visions of the
Framers, so influenced by Locke and Montesquieu. These philosophers
maintained that the authority over foreign affairs was to be vested solely in
the Executive. They argued that, "legislative bodies lacked the compe-
tence to manage foreign affairs because they lacked the essential qualities
Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their authority; -to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls; -to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; -to Controversies to which
the United States shall be a Party..
12. U.N. CHARTER art. 1.
13. Michelle Smith, Expanding Permanent Membership in the UN Security Council:
Opening a Pandora's Box or Needed Change, 12 DICK. J. INT'L L. 173, 174 (1993).
14. John J. Kavanaugh, U.S. War Powers and the United Nations Security Council, 20 B.C.
INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 159, 168 (1997).
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of unity of design, secrecy, speed, and dispatch.... .""
Furthermore, those who seek to limit the Executive's war powers are
confronted with the expansive authority granted the President in Article
II, Section I of the Constitution versus the limited powers granted
Congress. In terms of war powers, Congress' authority is extremely
specific and can be enumerated and analyzed using a four-corners
approach to the Constitution. Article I, Section 8 sets forth Congress' war
powers in no uncertain terms:
11. To declare war, grant letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make
Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water,
12. To raise and support Armies, but no appropriation of
money to that use shall be for a longer term than two
years,
13. To provide and maintain a Navy,
14. To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of
Land and naval forces and,
18. To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper
for carrying into execution the foregoing powers and all
other powers vested by this Constitution in the
Government of the United States, or any Department or
Office thereof.
1 6
The power granted the Executive may be vague and broad because the
framers intended to create executive dominance in this realm. It is
possible that the president's power was not limited to a laundry list like
Congress' because the Executive's dominant role in the realm "was well
understood by the Framers raised on Locke, Montesquieu and Black-
stone."'7 However, was it the intent of the framers that this extensive grant
15. See ROBERT F. TURNER, REPEALING THE WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: RESTORING THE
RULE OF LAW IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 53 (1991).
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
17. Louis Henkin, Foreign Affairs and the Constitution, FOREIGrN AFFAIRS (Winter 1987-
88), at 43 quoted in TURNER, supra note 15, at 54.
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of authority be used to protect America in times of peril? Or was it
intended to give the Executive the mandate to protect the globe from
itself?
V. THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE UNITED NATIONS
PARTICIPATION ACT
In 1945, one of the Senate's main fears in ratifying the United Nations
Charter was that America would once again be drawn into a foreign war."
However, the concept that the United States might be perpetually
supplying troops for peacekeeping operations was not anticipated, because
peacekeeping operations are not specifically authorized under Chapter
VII. 9  Thus, such operations were not a foreseeable byproduct of
ratification. Rather, peacekeeping evolved from the charter's inability to
achieve its foundational goals through the codified mechanism.
The U.N.P.A. contains a further provision to the effect that nothing in
the Act itself is to be construed to authorize the President to contribute
forces "in addition" to those committed under a special agreement
negotiated pursuant to article 43. This adds a measure of ambiguity to
the question of whether the President has authority, apart from the
U.N.P.A., to contribute forces to U.N. operations.' °
The structure of Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter is an ascending scale
of measures that the Security Council may take in order to bring a state
into compliance with the goals of the charter. At the outset, the Security
Council must recognize that a breach of international peace has occurred
under Article 39.21 Subsequently, the Security Council may bind member
nations to take action, first under Article 41, then, if necessary, under
Article 42 of the charter.22 The fatal flaw in the charter's method comes
18. Michael J. Glennon, The Constitution and Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter,
85 AM. J. INT'L L. 74,75 (1991); see also U.N. CHARTER art. 39.
19. Reinhardt, supra note 9, at 252.
20. James A. R. Nafziger & Edward M. Wise, The Status in United States Law of Security
Counsel Resolutions Under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, 46 AM. J. COMp. L.
421,432 (1998).
21. Kavanaugh, supra note 14, at 171-72.
22. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 41-42. (Article 41 states that "the Security Council may
decide what measures not involving the use of armed forces are to be employed to give
effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the members of the United Nations to apply
such measures." Article 42 states that "the Security Council may take action by sea, air, or
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with the mechanism for assembling the forces necessary to carry out the
will of the Security Council. The much maligned and unfulfilled Article 43
of the charter provides the method for the fulfillment of Article 42;
however, Article 43 is ephemeral. 3 It may be argued that military action
under the rubric of Article 42 is actually contingent on the creation of an
Article 43 army. If this is the nature of the relationship, then there has
never been an Article 42 sanctioned military action, which means the
United Nations should not be involved in any Security Council-sanctioned
military actions.
The Achilles heel of Article 43, as far as the United States is con-
cerned, is that the special agreements to provide troops are subject to
ratification by member states according to individual state's constitutional
processes. 4 In the United States, that means that the Congress, not the
president, is vested with the power to implement an Article 43 agree-
ment.' 5 Nonetheless, the limitation of Congress' restriction on Article 43
agreements through the United Nations Participation Act (U.N.P.A.), has
not eliminated the Executive's unilateral authority to use American troops
in U.N. actions. However, it has affected the charter-based legitimacy of
Security Council resolutions in Korea, Iraq, and the former Yugoslavia.
Those who argue that the president can unilaterally supply troops to a
U.N. mission often rely on Section 6 of the U.N.P.A. which states: "In
order that there may be no doubt about the availability of our armed
forces ... Congress should ... confirm its view that the President has the
power and obligation, in compliance . . . with the Charter, to make the
forces provided in this agreement available to the Security Council.
2 6
However, the commitments in these committee reports were referring to
the deployment of troops under an already negotiated Article 43
agreement that does not exist.27 Nonetheless, presidents from Harry
land forces as may be necessary to maintain and restore international peace and
security .... ") Id.
23. See U.N. CHARTER art. 43. (Article 43 provides that "all members of the United
Nations in order to contribute to the maintenance of international peace and security,
undertake to make available to the Security Council, on its call ... armed forces, assistance
and facilities, including rights of passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining
international peace and security.") Id.
24. Timothy D. O'Hara, Without Justification: Misplaced Reliance on United Nations
Security Council Resolutions for Presidential War Making, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 583,
617 (1998).
25. Id.
26. Report Providing for the Appointment of Representatives of the United States in the
Organs and Agencies of the United Nations, and to Make Other Provision With Respect to
the Participation of the United States in Such Organization, S. REP. NO. 717, at 9 (1945).
27. TURNER, supra note 15, at 90.
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Truman to George W. Bush have relied on the ratification of the U.N.
Charter as vesting in them the authority to support the Security Council's
decisions. The interpretation of the U.N.P.A. and its limiting impact on
the president is a crucial starting point for any discussion of executive war
powers. Regardless of what Section 6 means, to argue that the military
obligation created in Article 42 supersedes the limitations placed on that
charter provision by the U.N.P.A. would be in derogation of both the
Constitution and the Supreme Court.'
VI. PEACEKEEPING OR WARMAKING?
When the United States joined the United Nations and the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) at the start of the Cold War,
Congress took care to ensure that the deployment of U.S. military power
would continue to occur under our constitutional process. This still left
unanswered the question of how, in practice, such international arrange-
ments would factor into the American constitutional process." Although
the public may overwhelmingly support a president's use of force, for
example, President George Bush's actions in Iraq, Congress did not and
cannot delegate its war powers through a treaty. Thus, even the staunchest
supporter of executive dominance must admit that the Congress intended,
through its passage of the U.N.P.A., to be involved in decisions supplying
forces to the Security Council.30 Therefore, the issue as to what the
U.N.P.A. mandates often finds itself hinged to partisan political positions.
Congress can denounce a treaty at its own discretion, but that does not
necessarily render the president impotent as to all U.N. operations. 3'
Rather, the president and the United Nations have avoided the quagmire
of Article 43 by categorizing full-scale military operations as police actions
or peacekeeping operations.
The United Nations faced its first military challenge when communist
North Korea invaded South Korea. The defense of Korea by the United
States and a handful of other nations was the Security Council's first use of
28. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 18 (1957).
29. Charles Tiefer, War Decisions in the Late 1990's by Partial Congressional Declaration,
36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 34 (1999).
30. Jane E. Stromseth, Treaty Constraints: The United Nations Charter and War Powers, in
THE U.S. CONSTITUTION AND THE POWER TO GO TO WAR 83, 85 (Gary M. Stern & Morton
H. Halperin eds. 1994).
31. See Diggs v. Schultz, 470 F.2d 461, 466 (D.C. Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 931
(1973). "Under our constitutional scheme, Congress can denounce treaties if it sees fit to do
so, and there is nothing the other branches of government can do about it." Id. See also
O'Hara, supra note 24, at 645.
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force. Because the Korean conflict was primarily an American-led
intervention, it tested the president's authority to act pursuant to a U.N.
decision. President Truman sent American troops to Korea without
Congressional approval. Truman maintained that any action taken by the
United Nations was not a "war" but an "international police action." His
theory was that this designation nullified the need for the Congress to
declare war.
It can be argued that the Congress implicitly tendered its support to
the action by passing a military appropriations bill that provided for the
funding of Korean military expenses. It was during these events that the
Supreme Court, in the Youngstown case, specifically bypassed the
opportunity to call Truman's actions unconstitutional. The precedent set
by Truman has become the foundation of the argument used by future
presidents justifying executive aggrandizement. By far the most striking
recent example of unilateral executive action came during the Bush
administration in response to Iraqi aggression.
On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait for reasons that are still
debatable. Shortly after the invasion, the United Nations Security Council
adopted resolution 678, which authorized member states cooperating with
Kuwait to "use all necessary means to uphold and implement" earlier
resolutions.32 After this resolution passed, the coalition forces launched
Operation Desert Storm on January 16, 1991."3 Unlike the Korean
conflict, the Persian Gulf conflict proceeded through the hierarchy of
Articles 39 and 42. The tactics of the Bush administration were not
surprising, but were effective. Like his predecessors, President George
Bush claimed that the American participation in Operation Desert Storm
was only as part of an international force for peace and, therefore, no
declaration of war was necessary.
After Operation Desert Storm, the United States sent troops to So-
malia and planned an invasion of Haiti. However, the Pandora's box was
not completely opened until 1993, when a few hundred U.S. marines were
sent to Macedonia as part of a peacekeeping unit, laying the groundwork
for NATO's eventual war with Serbia during the Clinton years and the
continuation of the Balkan operation in Macedonia. 34 The litany of
Security Council resolutions that followed the unrest in the former
Yugoslavia rendered President Clinton's constitutional authority even
32. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doc. S/Res/678 (1990), reprinted in 1 U.S. DEP'T ST.
DISPATCH 298 (1990).
33. Andrew Rosenthal, War in the Gulf: The Overview, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17,1991, at Al.
34. Elaine Sciolino, U.S. Says it Will Send 300 Troops to the Balkan Republic to Limit
Strife, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 1993, at Al.
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more debatable than Bush's before him. Although it should be noted that
none of the following resolutions authorized the use of force as a direct
means of maintaining the peace, all necessary means are authorized.
On September 25, 1991, the U.N. Security Council unanimously passed
Resolution 713-its first resolution concerning the former republics of
Yugoslavia. In this resolution the Security Council under Chapter VII
of the Charter of the United Nations, decided that all States should
implement a complete embargo of weapons to Yugoslavia ... In Reso-
lution 795 the Security Council authorized the U.N. Secretary General
to establish the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Macedonia...
The United States' offer to contribute additional personnel to the UN-
PROFOR was welcomed by the Security Council in Resolution 842...
Finally in Resolution 844 again acting under Chapter VII the Security
Council decided to authorize the reinforcement of the UNPROFOR.
35
VII. THE SUPREME COURT AND CONGRESS
The true predicament is that two branches of the government disagree
inherently on the issue of presidential war powers, and the third branch of
government has not resolved the issue and may not have the authority to
do so. Unlike prayer in school, abortion, or gun-control, where the
president and the Congress may disagree, war powers may not be within
the purview of the Supreme Court because of the political question
doctrine.
A. The Supreme Court
Although the role of the Supreme Court in the war-powers contro-
versy has been limited, the immense prestige and power of the Court
makes even its sporadic decisions significant. The Court has exercised
judicial restraint in this area, primarily on the basis that the issue is
inherently political and therefore non-justiciable. However, the Court, in
Baker v. Carr, announced its authority to essentially decide a Constitu-
tional war powers issue. "[Wlhether a matter has in any measure been
committed by the Constitution to another branch of government, or
whether the action of that branch exceeds whatever authority has been
committed ... is a responsibility of this Court as ... interpreter of the
35. Reinhardt, supra note 9, at 268.
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Constitution." Although the Court has not frequently applied the Baker
v. Carr rationale to the war powers debate, the Court, in United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., set forth a potential template for deciding the
issue.37
In Curtiss-Wright, the world was reintroduced to the president as the
"sole organ of the federal government in the field of foreign relations."
Yet this case is not a reliable precedent for supporting an Article 42
deployment, because the actions taken by the President in the Curtiss-
Wright case were not inconsistent with an act of Congress. However, an
Article 42 deployment would be in defiance of the U.N.P.A. The "counter-
force"39 to this jurisprudence came from the Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co.
v. Sawyer.4 ' During the conflict in Korea, Truman ordered the seizure of a
steel production plant using his independent constitutional powers as a
justification. However, the Court found that the seizure was not within the
president's power. In his concurring opinion, Justice Jackson set forth a
three-tiered framework that provided a fluctuating scale for the evaluation
of presidential power:4
(1)When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied authoriza-
tion of Congress, his authority is at its maximum, for it includes all that
he possesses in his own right plus all that Congress can delegate ... (2)
When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or
denial of authority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers,
but there is a zone of twilight in which its distribution is uncertain.
Therefore congressional inertia, indifference, or acquiescence may
sometimes, at least as a practical matter, enable, if not invite, measures
on independent presidential responsibilit-y . . . and,(3) When the Presi-
dent takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied will of
Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can only rely on his
own constitutional powers minus and constitutional powers of Congress
42
on the matter....
36. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).
37. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
38. Id. at 320.
39. Major Geoffrey Corn, Presidential War Power: Do the Courts Offer Any Answers? 157
MIL. L. REV. 180, 199 (1998).
40. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952),
41. Id. at 635-38.
42. Id.
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This fluctuating approach to analyzing war powers was affirmed in the
case of Dames & Moore v. Reagan.43 In this case, the Court upheld the
executive order issued by President Reagan which terminated all legal
claims against Iran then currently in U.S. courts. The Court utilized the
Jackson analysis from Youngstown. Therefore, it can be argued that the
Youngstown, Dames & Moore line of cases represent the most appropriate
vehicle to the resolution of a war powers debate. Thus, President
Reagan's unilateral war powers were at their lowest ebb when the
Congress demanded that the CIA cease funding the Contras in Nicaragua.
Although the Supreme Court has not directly decided the issue of the
president's decision to deploy troops for a U.N. mission, there are some
lower court decisions that are instructive. In particular, the Dellums v.
Bush case directly addressed the issue of unilateral presidential military
deployment." The case arose when fifty-four members of Congress
(including members from both houses) attempted to avail themselves of
the power of the judiciary to limit President George Bush's military
expulsion of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. However, the decision of this Court
was unfortunate because it decided to dismiss the claim using the rationale
that it was not "ripe." According to the Court, the claim failed to be ripe
because the entire Congress had not taken any position on the issue of the
president's plan to intervene in Kuwait.
Nonetheless, some of the language in this case is instructive. In the
future, it is likely that proponents of executive limitation will seize on the
following rationale articulated by the Court: "[w]hile the Constitution
grants to the political branches, and in particular to the Executive
responsibility for conducting the nation's foreign affairs, it does not follow
that the judicial power is excluded from the resolution of cases merely
because they may touch upon such affairs."45 Accordingly, the Executive
must be wary of the Dellums dicta to ensure that it does not become a
Congressional mission but merely remains an academic possibility.
While the zone of twilight is dicta, there is an undeniable reality about
the gloss that history has imposed on the text of the Constitution itself.
"The historical gloss hypothesis is premised on the conclusion that a
history of unilateral presidential war making decision demonstrates that
the Constitution should be interpreted to support executive authority to
make such unilateral decisions in the future."46 Although this gloss or
custom cannot supplant actual Constitutional doctrine, it can help define
43. Dames & Moore v. Reagan, 453 U.S. 660 (1983).
44. Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990).
45. Id. at 1145.
46. See Corn, supra note 39, at 238.
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the words of the text." Although this argument may run afoul of the
positions maintained by the traditional textualist it is clear from Justice
Frankfurter's position on the issue of custom, that the concept is tenable
and perhaps the President's best ally for supporting unilateral action.
Deeply embedded traditional ways of conducting government cannot
supplant the Constitution or legislation, but they give meaning to the
words of a text or supply them. It is an inadmissibly narrow conception
of American constitutional law to confine it to the words of the Consti-
tution and to disregard the gloss which life has written upon them. In
short, a systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to the
knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned, engaged in by
Presidents who have also sworn to uphold the Constitution, making as it
were such exercise of power part of the structure of our government,
may be treated as a gloss on the executive power vested in the President
by Section 1 of Article 11.
48
B. The Congress and the War Powers Resolution
The relationship between congressional and executive war powers has
been analogized by some to be in a state of cold war. Although that may
be an exaggeration, the fact is that the Senate ratified the charter, and the
Congress later enacted the United Nations Participation Act. Further,
when Congress passed the War Powers Resolution, they made clear their
intent to limit unilateral Presidential war making.49 While the Resolution
has proven to be ineffective and far too complicated, its purpose is
undeniable. The purpose is to "insure that the collective judgment of both
Congress and the President will apply to the introduction of United States
Armed Forces into hostilities.. .and to the continued use of such forces...
,,50
Additionally, there have been several recent attempts to further limit
Presidential authority to place American forces under foreign command,
but because of Executive opposition and veto, these measures have been
defeated. Some of the proposed legislative measures include: (1) the
Nickles-Cochran Amendments to the Department of Defense Appropria-
tions Act of 1994, (2) the Peace Powers Act of 1994, (3) the National
47. See FISHER, supra note 6, at 190.
48. Id.; see also Youngstown Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635-37 (1952).
49. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541-48 (1994).
50. Id. § 1541.
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Security Revitalization Act, and (4) the United States Armed Forces
Protection Act of 1996."'
The War Powers Resolution (WPR) in Section 1543 directs the Presi-
dent to submit a report to Congress within forty-eight hours of the
introduction of U.S. forces into combat in a hostile environment. Once a
report has been submitted, Section 1544 gives the President unilateral
deployment powers for sixty days, with a possible thirty-day extension.53
However, the President, under Section 1543 must terminate the deploy-
ment within the sixty days unless Congress: (1) has declared war, (2)
authorized the continuation of the action, or (3) cannot meet because the
U.S. is under attack.54 The thrust of the WPR is to encourage the
President to consult with Congress in every possible instance.55
Unfortunately for all Americans, the WPR has proven to be ineffec-
tive and rife with inherent contradictions.56 Its effectiveness is not only
hampered by ambiguous language, but by the fact that, unless the
president reports under Section 1543(a), the clock does not begin to run.
An example of this deficiency was when President Reagan reported to
Congress on U.S. air strikes against Libya; the clock never started to tick
because of the general nature of the report.
57
One of the main deficiencies of the WPR is that it runs contrary to the
intent of the framers. "One of the reasons given by John Locke and others
for vesting control over relations with the external world in the executive
was that the details of such matters were not susceptible to regulation by
antecedent laws." ' However, the WPR attempts to legislate war, which is
not only naive, but dangerous to the men and women of the armed forces.
Imagine a president forced to order imprudent military tactics in order to
avoid the hammer of the WPR from dismembering the operation. Clearly,
the WPR has the potential to divest the President of his position as
Commander-in-Chief, and vest that power in the legislature to microman-
age a fluid and foreign situation.
VIII. CONCLUSION
War powers go to the very core of our republic. As Chief Justice
51. Corn, supra note 39, at 247-48.
52. 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a) (1994).
53. Id. § 1544.
54. Id. §§ 1543(a), 1544(b).
55. Id. § 1542.
56. FISHER, supra note 6, at 131.
57. Id. at 132.
58. TURNER, supra note 15, at 149.
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Marshall once said, "it is a constitution we are expounding." The actions
required to constitutionally authorize an exercise of war powers have roots
in the text and original intent of the Constitution, yet such actions evolve
during each era. 9 Although we must recognize new evolving paradigms in
a post-Cold War world, the fact remains that we have an effective and
valued separation of powers in this country.
The use of American might in support of anything other than the
direct will of the American people as expressed through their elected
representatives may indeed require an entirely new paradigm for the
execution of war powers. However, we must clarify our goals as to this
foreign and domestic policy issue. Do we want a President with the power
to force American troops to don blue helmets and take orders from a
modern-day Foch? Do we want a president with the authority to supply
men and materiel in support of a U.N. invasion of an African nation in the
midst of a holocaust? Or, do we want a president who waits upon the will
of the people before making these momentous decisions? In light of the
tragic death of so many Americans in New York, Virginia and Pennsyl-
vania, America, now more than ever, must have faith in the Founding
Father's vision for a democracy that can protect its borders and citizenry.
As we embark upon this path, we should remember the legacy of the
Swordbearers. An undefined policy in this realm will result in indetermi-
nate leadership while soldiers are in the field. The increasing centraliza-
tion of war powers in the hands of one person is in derogation of the
separation of powers. We must ask ourselves, has the world changed so
much since 1914? If the answer is no, are we willing to have our own Lions
of July?
59. Tiefer, supra note 29, at 38.
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